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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
shortage of scientific and sociological literature which can enable the courts
to adequately treat this problem. What literature does exist, is mostly devoted
to criticizing the rule. Scientific studies have suggested that literature is not a
primary source of sexual stimulation. They also tend to prove that those people
who are most prone to be stimulated by these books, are also those who are
least likely to read them.5
Freedom of expression is one of our most cherished freedoms and the
courts must be very careful not to allow infringement on this freedom in the
name of suppression of obscenity. In the past several years, there have been
attempts to censor books which are chiefly concerned with sex, i.e., Henry
Miller's Tropic of Cancer,52 James Joyce's Ulysses,5 3 and D. H. Lawrence's
Lady Chatterley's Lover,51 all of which later became best sellers. If the "hard-
core" pornography standard had been applicable in these cases, it seems doubtful
that the propriety of these books would even have been questioned. It is
apparent from their acceptance by the public, that their censorship would not
have been in accord with the desires of the community as a whole. Whenever
the law circumscribes or even threatens to circumscribe an author's freedom to
express himself on a topic, and a large percentage of the community wants to
read what he has to say, there exists a serious threat to our freedom of
expression.
In general it would seem that a large segment of the community is in
favor of less censorship. This has been indicated by the acceptance by the
public of books which have been previously censored, by the liberal trend in
the decisions of the courts, and by the decreasing number of statutes dealing
with special areas of censorship. 55 Censorship is a restriction on our basic
freedom and as such should be as severly limited as possible. The New York
Court of Appeals, by adopting the "hard-core" pornography test, has taken
the lead in this direction with a more liberal application of our censorship
statutes.
I. D. R.
STATUTE PROSCRIBING SALE OF OBSCENE MATERIALS REQUIRES SCIENTER
The New York Penal Law Section 1141 provides that, "A person who
sells.., or has in his possession with intent to sell... any obscene ... book...
is guilty of a misdemeanor." In 1958, after exhaustive analysis, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, concluded in People v. Shapiro that the language
employed in and the history of the statute invoked, as well as the statutes from
51. Ibid.
52. Besig v. United States., 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953).
53. Supra note 33.
54. Supra note 18.
55. Entertainment: Public Pressure and the Law, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 326, 328 (1957),
lists New York, Maryland, Virginia and Kansas as the only states which still censor movies.
Excelsior Pictures v. Board of Regents, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 165 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1957), points out
that the Supreme Court has effectively destroyed most of the grounds upon which New
York can censor movies.
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which it is derived, clearly indicates the legislative intent to dispense with
scienter as an element of the crime defined, and to impose the risk of violation
on those who fail to inspect that which they sell or distribute to others for
public sale.56
One year later, in Smith v. California,57 the Supreme Court struck down
a Los Angeles City Ordinance which proscribed, 58 and had been construed to
impose strict liability for,5 9 mere possession of obscene prints, regardless of the
offender's awareness of the contents. The Court felt that if the ordinance
fulfilled its 'purpose and imposed criminal liability upon the bookseller without
knowledge of contents, he would tend to restrict sales to those books he bad
inspected. Thus, the State would have imposed a restriction upon the distribution
of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature, a censorship by
indirect means which would have been invalid if attempted directly.
The status of Section 1141 thereupon became uncertain. Three months
after the Smith decision, the Court of Appeals, in a memorandum decision,
dismissed an information and remitted a fine upon its authority.60 Within
months, the court which had decided Shapiro, without alluding to its earlier
decision, dismissed an information for lack of proof of defendant's knowledge
of the obscene character of the magazine holding that the statute required such
proof.61
In People v. Finklestein,"2 the Court of Appeals was required to decide if,
as defendant contended, Section 1141 was unconstitutional because it did not
expressly require scienter. The Court dismissed this argument concluding that
the definition of the crime is instinct with the idea of scienter.0 3 In reaching
this conclusion the Court, guided by the strong presumption of constitutionality
attending legislative enactments, found that the statute on its face required
scienter. While conceding that the statute might be susceptible of either
interpretation, the Court considered itself obliged to adopt the construction
which would preserve its validity. This interpretation, furthermore, had the
effect of putting this requirement in the statute "as definitely as if it had been
so amended by the legislature." 64 The Court still reversed the conviction,
however, believing that the Shapiro decision, which was the prevailing precedent
at the time of the trial, may have misled defendants into believing that proof
of their actual knowledge was irrelevant.
56. 6 A.D.2d 271, 275, 177 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674 (2d Dep't 1958).
57. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
58. Los Angeles Municipal Code § 41.01.1.
59. 161 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 860, 327 P.2d 636 (1958).
60. People v. Engel, 7 N.Y.2d 1002, 200 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1960).
61. People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 11 A.D.2d 799, 205 N.Y.S.2d 94 (2d
Dep't 1960). See also People v. Douglas, 12 AXD.2d 194, 209 N.Y.S.2d 734 (3d Dep't
1961) construing Section 1141 to require scienter and dismissing the indictment for failure
to allege knowledge on the part of defendant.
62. 9 N.Y.2d 342, 214 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1961).
63. Id. at 344, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
64. Id. at 345, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
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Judge Van Voorhis, dissenting, argued that Smith v. California served to
render Section 1141 unconstitutional. In view of the clear demonstration in
Shapiro of the legislature's intent to dispense with scienter, a construction
reading into the statute a requirement of scienter exceeded judicial power.
Despite the dissent, the decision does not shock. If there is a possible
construction which will uphold the statute, the Court should adopt it. The
earlier decisions in the Appellate Division afford good evidence that the
construction is not strained. Further, if the statute is clear on its face, the
court need not attempt to determine the intent of the legislature. Absent the
Shapiro decision, it is extremely unlikely that a legislative intent contrary to
the holding of the Supreme Court would have been considered. Certainly, if
the statute were stricken, it would have been reenacted as now interpreted.
The only objection open is the impact of the decision upon the defendants.
The disposition of the case does not, however, deny them their day in court
on the question of scienter. If they have objection, it is only upon the grounds
that they have been deprived of the benefit of a fortuitous gap in the law.
Bd.
DuE PROCESS AND POLICE POWER- CRIMINAL STATUTES
The enactment of a criminal statute must be a reasonable exercise of the
police power under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. 0 For a court to uphold a statute making certain conduct criminal, it
must find some clear and reasonable connection between the statute and the
promotion of health, comfort, safety and welfare of society. 6
In People v. Bunis,6' the defendant was the owner of a bookstore in which
coverless magazines were sold. An information filed against the defendant in
the City Court of Buffalo charged him with a violation of Section 436-d of the
New York Penal Law.68 The City Court dismissed the information on the grounds
of stare decisis, noting that the supreme court,69 sitting in another county,
had held the same statute unconstitutional as an arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of the police power. An appeal from the dismissal was taken to the
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, 0 the State contending that this statute was a
lawful use of the police power in that its purpose was to prevent bookdealers,
such as the defendant, from tearing off the covers of magazines, returning the
65. While there is some indication that the scope of the police power under art. 1,
§ 6 of the New York Constitution is narrower than under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
is not now relevant to make a distinction; See Opinions of the Attorney General (1959) at
96.
66. Cf. Trio Distr. Corp. v. City of Albany, 2 N.Y.2d 690, 163 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1957);
Defiance Milk Products v. DuMond, 309 N.Y. 537, 132 N.E.2d 829 (1956); People v.
Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 17 N.E. 343 (1888).
67. 9 N.Y.2d 1, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961).
68. N.Y. Penal Law § 436-d:
Any person who knowingly sells . . . any magazine . . . from which the cover
or title page has been removed . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
69. People ex rel Bunis v. Simmers, 13 Misc. 2d 1097, 181 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
70. 24 Misc. 2d 561, 205 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
